In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the additional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework for a post-selection based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally demonstrate that the post-selection based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian attacks in the presence of this excess noise.
In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the additional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework for a post-selection based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally demonstrate that the post-selection based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian attacks in the presence of this excess noise. Continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) [1] was introduced as an alternative to the original discrete variable single photon schemes [2] . CV-QKD promises to offer higher secret key rates, better detection efficiencies and higher bandwidths than its single photon counterpart and is easily adapted to current communication systems. Currently the two main protocols in CV-QKD are post-selection (PS) [3] and reverse reconciliation (RR) [4] . These protocols are based on the random Gaussian modulation of coherent states using either homodyne [4] or heterodyne [5] detection and both have been experimentally demonstrated [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . At present PS-based CV-QKD has practical advantages in terms of key distillation and has been demonstrated experimentally for up to 90% channel loss [7] .
Reverse reconciliation CV-QKD, due to its inherent nature, easily incorporates excess noise into the protocols, and security proof have been demonstrated in the case of individual Gaussian attacks [4, 5] , non-Gaussian attacks [11] , collective attacks [12, 13] (with their Gaussian optimality [14] ) and coherent states using homodyne detection [15] . For PS CV-QKD, the addition of excess noise into the analysis is quite difficult. The original protocol [3] only considered pure or vacuum states in its scheme and so far all post-selection protocols since have concentrated on the unrealistic case of zero excess noise [7, 16, 17] . Recently however, excess noise using a hybrid protocol, consisting of both post-selection and either direct or reverse reconciliation, was considered for the case of collective attacks [18] .
In this paper, we present a protocol for calculating the effect of excess Gaussian noise (EGN) on post-selection where two way classical communication is permitted, and show its security when considering either individual or collective attacks. We apply our analysis to an experimental demonstration and conclude that good key rates can be obtained under the realistic condition of channel with loss and excess Gaussian noise.
We extend the original PS CV-QKD protocol [3] as follows. The sender, Alice draws two random numbers S As both amplitude and phase play the same role, we will only explicitly consider one quadrature for the rest of this paper, and denote Alice's encoding and Bob's measurement as S A and m B respectively. The probability that Bob measures a particular value m B given that Alice used a particular encoding S A is given by the conditional probability,
where V V is the variance of the vacuum noise. Note that in this paper the vacuum noise is normalized to V V = 1. The error rate in Bob deciding whether Alice encoded positively or negatively is thus given by
The mutual information rate between Alice and Bob is given as a function of this error probability using the Shannon formula [19] I AB = Φ(1 − 2P e ) where
Bob then informs Alice over a public channel which quadrature he measured and at what time interval. Alice and Bob then both announce the absolute values of their encodings |S A | and measurement results |m B | respectively. This is in contrast to previous zero excess noise protocols where only Alice announces her absolute value [3, 7] . Alice and Bob then post-select information for which they have a mutual information advantage over Eve and discard information for which they do not. Alice and Bob also choose a random subset of data to characterize the channel loss η, the EGN ξ and check that the statistics are Gaussian. Finally Alice and Bob use a two way reconciliation algorithm to reconcile their data.
As with any type of eavesdropping attack, we assume any EGN on the quantum channel is always attributed to, and controlled by, the eavesdropper, Eve. The fact that there exists excess noise on the channel allows Eve to be entangled to Bob. There exists a known upper bound ξ < 2η [16] to the amount of EGN ξ that can be added on a channel of transmission η above which Alice and Bob's quantum correlation cease to exist [4] . We consider here the entangling cloner attack which has been shown optimal for PS CVQKD with collective attacks in the presence of EGN [18] . The entangling cloner attack (see Fig. 1 (b) ) consists of Eve replacing the lossy line by a beam splitter of transmission η where one of the inputs is Alice's initial state in a quadrature basis given by
and the second input is one arm of an entangled state Eve has created given by
where
is the variance of the entangled beam she injects to simulate the EGN ξ. Eve keeps one of the entangled beams (denoted E 1 ) and one of the outputs of the beam splitter (denoted E 2 ) while she sends the remaining output to Bob (denoted B) through a perfect noiseless and lossless line. When Bob performs his homodyne measurement and announces its absolute value |m B |, Eve's state collapses to one of the four possible pure state given by |ψ a b E1,E2 , where the superscript a = 0, 1 refers to Alice's encoded bit and the subscript b = 0, 1 to Bob's measured bit. 
The inner products between these states can be computed explicitly by performing the Gaussian integrations in Eq. (6). For example, the four terms that distinguishes Eve's input for attacking Alice from her inputs for attacking Bob are:
We see that at the critical value of m Given Eve's two input states, we need to find her accessible information. If this is smaller than I AB , Alice and Bob keep the bit and distill a key from it. Our task now is to find Eve's accessible information for such states. We bound this information from above for both individual and collective attacks.
A bound on Eve's accessible information I
(i)
E in the case of individual attacks is calculated by providing her with the knowledge on whether Alice and Bob's bit values match or not. With this information, Eve's input is reduced to two pure states. Her accessible information is bounded by
where p 1 is the probability that Alice and Bob obtains the same bits and p 2 is the probability that their bits differ, and
are the normalised inner products between the states that Eve distinguishes [20] . We note that this bound corresponds to the Levitin bound as given in [3] for the case of no added noise. We apply Holevo's theorem [21] on Eve's input states, ρ E , to bound Eve's information in terms of the von Neumann entropy, S(ρ), and obtain the amount of information I (c) E accessible by Eve when performin collective attacks
Figure (2) shows the difference in mutual information from Bob's point of view when Alice announces S A for a fixed value of η and ξ. For each η and ξ, Alice then chooses the value of V opt A such that the weighted integral over the positive information region Ω given below is maximised.
In principle, as long as the post-selection region is nonempty, Alice and Bob can always distill a finite amount of key. At a certain noise threshold however, we expect that there will be no more post-selectable region. This is clear for ξ = 2 η [16] , since then the state between Alice and Bob becomes separable. In this case, Eve can do an intercept and resend attack in which I E > I AB for all values of S A and m B .
But even before the separability limit is reached, the postselectable region may become empty. To analyse this, we consider the case when S A is large. In such a case, Alice and Bob would share the same bits with a high probability. Eve's accessible information then tends to Φ 1 − f 2 1 . In this limit, Eve's input becomes ever closer to being just two classical pure states and so Holevo's bound would tend to the same limiting information. Equating this with I AB , we obtain two solutions for m l± B :
In other words, the region of post-selectibility asymptotes to these two lines as S A increases (see Fig. 2 ). The noise threshold ξ 0 over which the quantum channel is insecure is obtained when the two lines m Experimental results superimposed on theoretical lower bounds of secure key rates at transmission η = 0.47 ± 0.002 when Eve does a collective attack and an individual attack (inset). Unfilled data points with arrows have error bars going to negative ∆I. The shaded region indicates the noise threshold for secure keys. The experimental results were obtained using an encoding variance optimized for the individual attack bound. Fig. 1(a) shows the schematic of our experiment. In this setup we encoded keys on the amplitude quadrature and simulated the loss of the line by using a variable attenuator and the added noise by adding a random Gaussian signal onto the amplitude quadrature on Alice's amplitude modulator. The transmitted light is detected using a homodyne detection setup at Bob's station. The two sets of time series, Alice's encoding S A and Bob's measurement m B were analysed using the tools developed in [7] . We note that extraction of the final key can be performed using the methods described in [7] with an average efficiency of 2 to 4 % for all datasets with positive raw information rates ∆I. Figure 3 shows experimental results superimposed onto theoretical bounds of total post-selected information rates ∆I = I AB − I E at channel transmission η = 47% for individual and collective attacks, as a function of channel EGN ξ. The experimental mutual information rate between Alice and Bob I AB is calculated by comparing the two signal-processed time series S x A and m x B . This quantity is less than the theoretical calculation due to experimental imperfections associated with the encoding (e.g. non-optimum encoding variance), detection (e.g. homodyne inefficiency) and signal processing. Experimental uncertainty is calculated for I AB due to the finite number of data points. The information rate for Eve I E is calculated theoretically, with error bars in I E calculated using the uncertainties in channel transmission, EGN and Alice's variance V A .
The experimental data points ∆I exp are in good agreement with the theoretical results. For some of the higher EGN cases, the error bars extend towards the negative region. It should be emphasized however, that this is mainly due to the finite number of collected data that results in statistical uncertainties. In our experiment, 2.4MBits of data were taken per run. The theoretical curves for ∆I in Fig. 3 monotonically decreases until they reach exactly zero at the security threshold line. No secure keys can be generated in the shaded region. Fig. 4 shows the experimental results superimposed on contour plots of ∆I as a function of η and ξ. Three sets of experimental runs were taken for η ≈ 0.2, 0.5, 0.8. Filled and unfilled data points indicate ∆I exp > 0 and ∆I exp ≤ 0 respectively. We obtained positive information rates for η = 0.2 for ξ = 0.1. In principle, lower η is attainable; the experimental demonstration for such cases is left for future work.
In conclusion, we have extended the original post-selection protocol [3] to take into account the effect of channel EGN for individual and collective Gaussian attacks by an eavesdropper. In both cases, we find that the scheme is still secure. We have also presented an experimental demonstration, which verifies for the first time that continuous variable quantum cryptography using post-selection is secure in the presence of channel loss as well as EGN. This is important since realistic laser sources and optical fibers [8] inevitably inherit EGN. Reanalyzing our results from [7] using the theory presented in this paper we conclude that the small amount of EGN present in that experiment would have had negligible effect on the key rates if properly accounted for.
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